The Monaco weekend

The weekend in Monaco was a fairly pleasant one. The weather was not bad and the controversy was minimal. Monaco is always a buzz although the F1 race was not exceptional although the Mercedes screw-up made for an exciting last few laps and plenty of post-race chatter. Nico Rosberg was an undeserving winner and his celebrations seemed hollow, but as he said, you take what you get. One had to feel for Lewis Hamilton and I felt that he handled it very well. No matter what Lewis does someone thinks it is wrong.

In the paddock, there was some talk about the Strategy Group decisions of the previous week but no-one was getting worked up about them. The consensus was that refuelling is simply NOT going to happen and there were more discussions about the situation regarding customer cars. There was a meeting with Bernie Ecclestone on this subject on Friday morning to which only a handful of (big) teams were invited. They seem keen on the idea, but I just do not understand how any of the parties involved can reasonably agree to such a thing. If there is no way that a small ambitious team can climb the ladder in Formula 1, what is the point in being there simply to make up the numbers? It is wiser to climb other ladders where one can be successful.

And what would happen when one of these big teams decides – as inevitably they will – that they no longer want to be in F1. Or when one team consistently builds better cars than its rivals? If one team is dominant and supplies chassis and engines to rivals, the other big teams will be pushed back to fourth or fifth in the pecking order and, as McLaren is finding out, this weakens them.

The concept has already been gone through before by CART back in the 1980s.

Championship Auto Racing Teams Inc (CART) was running the IndyCar series at the time. Teams built their own chassis. There were some car manufacturers who sold cars to others, but there was great variety with companies like McLaren, Penske, Chaparral, Phoenix, Eagle, March and Wildcat all winners. Others such as Longhorn, Coyote, Parnelli, Lightning, Interscope, Primus and Rattlesnake did not win. However, over time the bigger chassis manufacturers were able to invest more than the smaller ones and so by the mid-1980s the number of manufacturers had thinned out because teams could buy more competitive March and Lola chassis.Even Penske gave up building his own cars. When March hit trouble only Lola remained until Reynard joined the fight in the mid-1990s. There were a few attempts to challenge the status quo along the way, but in the end the money was not there to sustain them and so eventually only Lola remained. CART became a one-chassis championship. Today no-one considers CART to be a rival of F1 as was once the case. Today the technology is unimportant and the series is dominated by a few well-organised teams, which win depending on the engines and who does a better job. Ganassi, Penske and Andretti have won the last 12 titles between them and a 13th will be won by one of those three in 2015. The series is entertainment, but irrelevant and the audience is tiny. The US motorsport scene is dominated by NASCAR, which does the whole show business thing better and even has road cars that look like the racing machinery (even if there is nothing at all the same bar the shape).

The basic logic for customer cars is that F1 cannot support 12 competing constructor teams, all of which are doing what amounts to parallel development work. This is very wasteful, but at the same time this created the cut-throat world that led to the development of the vibrant motorsport industry in the UK. The culture was always one of “must try harder”. The teams at the back of the grid struggle for money because they do not have the results – or more importantly the exposure – to bring in more. These teams tend to be supported by eccentric wealthy folk who either run out money and/or enthusiasm or they make enough of an impact to move up the F1 ladder. Using the same or similar engines is sensible in that it is impossible for everyone to build their own engines, but having a limited number of chassis is not at all the same thing.

It makes sense to the big teams because they see ways to get return on their investment at minimal cost. The problem is that when one takes this idea to its logical conclusion, it makes more sense for the bigger teams to own the smaller teams rather than just being suppliers. Running twice as many cars does not cost twice as much money and the bigger teams will inevitably want as much control as possible over smaller teams, to ensure that they do as well as they possibly can – and do everything that the bigger teams want. Having six constructor teams plus six customers would very quickly change to a situation in which there would be six four-car teams.

So I would argue that having customer chassis does not protect weak teams but rather condemns them to lose all independence. And what happens when big teams quit? At the moment we have Ferrari, Mercedes, Red Bull and McLaren who constitute the “big team” status. One might be able to rely on Ferrari and McLaren because their DNA is F1 (although after Ferrari floats things could change), but Mercedes will go at the drop of a hat if the next chairman is not a fan and Red Bull is already whining about departing because it cannot win races. Two of the four big teams thus cannot be relied upon to be around in the long-term, even if Bernie Ecclestone has written big penalty clauses into their contracts. If they want to go they will go. Toyota did exactly that six years ago. The staff lost their jobs and the team shut down. We also lost Honda, BMW and Renault at the same time (all team owners) but racers like Ross Brawn and Peter Sauber stepped up and kept those teams alive. Thus the idea of pushing out the racers makes no sense at all.

The other thing that makes no sense at all is that the teams have been given power to make decisions about the regulations. This is daft. You don’t ask footballers to decide on the rules of football, do you? Inevitably they will argue their own cases on all occasions and so nothing will ever be agreed. This is why the Strategy Group came along to try to restrict the number of decision-makers, but that is not right either because that means only half the teams in the football league are allowed to change the rules. It’s crazy.

What is required is a governing body that governs, a promoter that promotes and teams that behave like teams. There is nothing wrong with the promoter making some money, but it would be best if this was a sensible kind of promoter’s fee – 10 to 15 percent. Beyond that is simply greedy and to the detriment of the sport. The sport does not need private equity jackals, squeezing every penny out. We need a promoter that works towards creating harmony so that the sport can work as a proper corporation and can then concentrate on being better than other sports, rather than always beating itself up. The key is really fairness.

A good team will beat a bad team no matter what vehicles they race and how much money they have. Thus financial control is absolutely logical. There is no need to waste money. The division of the revenues should reflect success but only in moderation, as the smaller teams will only grow stronger if they can afford to do so. Thus there is an argument that the value of winning should be reduced, or even negated completely because success will bring money from other sources, such as sponsorship. in other words, if everyone gets an equal share of the revenues, the big teams will still have more money.

The other thing that the sport needs is better promotion. Right now promotion is left to the TV companies and race promoters. This puts a strain on both such groups because they are already paying out hugely for rights. These organisations are the ones that deal directly with the public and so they should be allowed more money to invest to put on a better show, or to create a better experience to grow the audience. Cuts in the fees for both would be a good idea because with financial control, an even spread of prize money and a promoter who is not greedy, there would be money available to do these things and make the sport more attractive to the ultimate customers. It would obviously help if TV was not pay-to-view, it would obviously help if the top people in the sport were not swathed in controversy and unseemly matters, such as the new tax battles that Bernie Ecclestone is going through, or the road safety palaver that Jean Todt has created with his ambitions, which seem to be more personal than for the FIA. The FIA already has a very successful road safety operation in the FIA Foundation. There is no need to build a parallel operation. And the conflicts of interest are everywhere, as we have seen already. At Monaco there was another attempt made to make Todt feel uncomfortable and to draw F1 into this mess with the anti-alcohol lobby pointing out that the sport does a lot to promote booze but Todt refuses to do anything about it, while the road safety lobby are desperately keen to stop drink-driving. Todt seems to be on both sides…

Anyway, the race came and went and on Monday we headed home on the highways of France, leaving the Cote d’Azur at eight on a quiet holiday Monday. The long weekend traffic built up as we went and with the Rhone Valley “en accordéon”, speeding up and slowing down because there were too many folk on the road, we decided to do something different and not struggle through Lyons and so turned west instead at Givors and headed down the valley of the River Gier. It was here that the great Georges Boillot fought the Mercedes for victory in 1914 with his outpaced Peugeot, winning himself a place in the pantheon of French racing stars. Further down the valley near Saint-Etienne is a drab little town called St-Chamond, where a youngster called Alain Prost grew up and started his career.

We then climbed up over the hills of the Forez, where there were Grand Prix races in 1946 (won by Raymond Sommer) and then it was downhill almost as far as Clermont-Ferrand before turning north up the A71 to Paris. It was longer in terms of mileage, but we were able to run faster and so we were back in Paris by the early evening, without having to deal with the vast traffic bank holiday jams getting into and across the capital.

71 thoughts on “The Monaco weekend

  1. Brilliant blog Joe, thanks for taking the time to break down the elephant. Did you get to hear the Canal+ interviews with Todt on the grid and later with BE ?(interviewed by Jean Alesi!) I found them confusing, which doesn’t help my humble efforts to understand what’s going on. That’s why I appreciate your perspective on what remains my favourite sport 😉

  2. Sorry Joe, I disagree Nico earned the win. He still has to drive the race.

    You hit the nail on the head with this comment. This sums it up completely.

    “What is required is a governing body that governs, a promoter that promotes and teams that behave like teams. There is nothing wrong with the promoter making some money, but it would be best if this was a sensible kind of promoter’s fee – 10 to 15 percent. “

  3. Completely agree with your analysis of the state of F1, one could even say the same is going on in society at large, but instead of teams it’s all the people that work and have an income. Rewarding succes is good, but obscenities should be removed……but the banker guild still don’t get it that…

    On Lewis I had a question though, I agree that he was in his right to feel bad about it…..but a good driver who also thinks a bit further than his steering wheel and pedals should also think about the situation he is in and maybe he should have realised that track position is always king at Monaco and that those remaining laps were never going to be a whole lot….so should he not have said sorry guys I am staying on track!?

    1. I disagree with your Lewis comment. The problem is too many strategists and data links back to HQ. The strategy should only be between the driver and his race engineer.

      Mercedes looked like shmucks on Sunday simply because they have too many chiefs; too many Indians and too many cooks to ruin the broth. In short they waste too much money on irrelevance.

      As Joe said recently, what F1 needs is heroes. This wasted technology and effort distracts from the simplicity of drivers racing against other drivers.

      1. I can see your point, but then to me a great driver is still one that then says sorry I’m doing it my way. I mean without any of the data I still saw this one coming from just watching it on TV….surely an experienced racing driver with his amount of talent and enough brass to tell the team off when they’re talking to him at the wrong time should be able to figure out that track position on Monaco is always king. Another circuit would’ve been a different story….

        1. I think maybe you don’t realize the nature of the mistake. Everybody agrees that track position is the most important thing at Monaco. That includes the team that called Lewis in for the pit stop. The team never decided to exchange track position for fresh tires.

          Rather, they erroneously thought they had ample time to get fresh tires while holding track position. Thus, it was neither a strategic error nor a tactical error. It was a simple arithmetic error, a mistake which would not have happened had they been using human eyeballs and stop watches to keep track of the cars.

          So, I don’t think you’re missing the old days when drivers lacked radio communication. I think you’re missing the old days when drivers’ wives kept track of the race using clipboards and stop watches 😉

          1. Nope, it wasn’t a maths error. Owing to Monaco’s topography, the teams do not have complete GPS and timing data over lap sectors. When the M-B team were calculating time differences, they did so on the basis of partial data (ie they did not know whether the gaps between Hamilton, Rosberg and Vettel were reducing or growing).

            If a team makes a blunder based on partial data, it is a strategic error.

  4. Joe , saw you twice last weekend on TV ; One I am sure of ; with Ted Kravitz from SKY last Saturday asking your
    thoughts on how to solve F1 , which is a re-distributing of the monnies involved
    After he walked away from the 4 of you ( also Damon Hill and 2 more ( ex- drivers ? ) he apologized to us the viewers
    in getting the names and facts of these 2 ex-drivers wrong . He thought one of them ( so not next to Damon , but the other
    one ) was Bertrand Gachot ….. ( The guy with the affair with the London taxi driver – hope I write his name OK ?? )
    By any chance can you give me the name of the other 2 drivers ? ; just curious ….

    The other one ( and this is getting a very serious habit of me ; spotting you during a GP weekend ) was
    on the grid , on Sunday but not 100 % sure.
    Something technical too … Christian Danner from RTL+ Germany told something about a ( controlled ) way
    to release the clutch ; first you release it 100 % and than as soon as there is slip noticed the clutch “” engages “”
    a little bit back to stop slipping ; do you know the English name for this , so how in the F1 world this is called ?
    This is not only done during the start but , if needed, with every gearchange.

    1. I was chatting to Damon, Bertrand Gachot and a mate of his who was not a driver, but I think is in business with Bert. I think the problem was that Ted confused Bert with Thierry Boutsen and was talking about him having lived in Monaco, which he never did. It is entirely possible that I appeared on TV on Sunday as I was on the grid (it was a zoo, filled with unknown celebrities), but it did allow me a few interesting conversations, which is why I do it.

      1. Yes you are right, Ted Kravitz thought Bertrand Gachot was Thierry Boutsen and only realised it was not when he walk away and then he explained his mistake to the us, the SKY viewers.

  5. Perhaps new or smaller teams should be able to run customer cars for a set period say two years. Then they would have to make their own. If we look at the current teams most of them emerged as customers before be
    coming self sufficient. Even Mercedes started with a Matra and a DVD. Williams ran customer cars three times. Ferrari learned his trade running alfa. And consider the contribution made by March to nurturing new teams.

  6. I read about the Italian WRC driver who crashed on Sunday or Monday and had to wait 3hrs for medical attention…..that’s utterly disgraceful

    I though Todt was all about road safety?!

  7. There have been suggestions that a very strong push for customer cars at the Tactical Group (sic) came from Ron Dennis. If this is the case, I’m struggling to reconcile this with McLaren’s heritage as racers and privateers — it only makes sense if McLaren thinks it can be one of the last two constructors standing.

    One expects to see that sort of naked self-interest from Maranello, but I would have hoped for better from Woking. I miss the Martin Whitmarsh era more than I suspected — and I think I’m beginning to remember why I never really liked McLaren very much in the 80s and 90s…

      1. And Ron Dennis started off with a team of F2 Brabhams. Ron and Neil Trundle couldn’t afford to buy the cars, so Ron Tauranac generously loaned them. This team (Rondel, retrospectively known as Project One) was successful enough to pay Tauranac for the cars at the end of the season.

        “Project Two” was the Motul sponsored self built F2 car. The car was pretty good, but F2 was very competitive and the season was very expensive. Motul withdrew as a sponsor owing to global economic events. Thus “Project Three” followed, with customer cars and drivers who brought sponsorship. Which evolved into Project Four Racing, the first “official” Project X team.

        Project Four raced cars purchased from Ralt and March, and assembled racing M1s for BMW. P4 was really good, earning enough to employ John Barnard as a designer for an F1 car. Then Marlboro intervened, advising McLaren and P4 that their shared sponsor thought a marriage was appropriate…

        What makes this relevant to customer cars in F1 in the 21st century?

        Firstly, it is very difficult to build your own cars AND develop them AND find sponsors, even in F2 in the 1970s. Which significant single seater series below F1 does not use spec cars? If more people are to build F1 cars, the sport has to change at the lower levels. There have to be two or three competitive customer cars in F3 which teams can develop.

        Secondly, information has to be shared. This is a naive argument and I don’t claim to have thought it through. Manufacturers of cars in F2 and F3 and Formula Ford told their customers what worked. They would advise on basic settings at an unfamiliar circuit. The official team car had the latest modifications, and if they worked customers could buy them next month. At the same time, customers were able to develop their cars independently.

        When Jack Brabham and Bruce McLaren raced Coopers, they were significant members of the development team. The other geezer who won a championship GP in his own car, Dan Gurney, won twice for Brabham and once for Porsche. All three sucked up knowledge.

        The assumption is that customer cars in F1 would be like BS Fabrications running 1977 spec McLarens in the 1978 series. (I’m not knocking BS Fabs because their cars were always well prepared.) Or that the customer car in 201x would be identical to last months factory car.

        But if manufacturers were compelled to share all of their data with customer teams, privateers (with time and money) might develop the cars into something different.

  8. I think we can all agree that it would be best if the non-megabuck teams had a prayer. But to be realistic about it, you need to have a better case than “we’ll need them one day when some rich teams leave”. That kind of thinking does zilch to help the fate of the small teams. What you need to have is some rational approach by which they have a prayer of actually competing.

    Budget caps won’t solve tghe problem. As best I can tell, they small teams will never have a chance as long as long as we have the combition of (a) aero playing such a huge roll, while (b) the rules are an ever-tightening straight jacket that kills innovation at the earliest hint of it. If Newey gets fed up with rules that essentially ban any new ideas that might actually work, then what the hell are the small teams supposed to do?

    As long as this continues, the teams with the most wind tunnel time will (or at least should) beat the snot out of who don’t. So, you need to either limit aero, or loosen the regs to allow new ideas, or both.

    Now, we can both agree that I don’t really know what the hell I’m talking about. Better to get ideas from people who do know what they’re talking about. Perhaps you could collect opinions from those on pit lane about their views about this? Because permitting the small teams to have a chance is not as simple as just bringing them back from the brink of financial disaster.

      1. Might you have a collection of thoughts from the guys on pit lane re: what sensible restrictions might be?

        Am not referring to the big teams’ mouthpieces, rather the technical people and other non-mouthpieces…

      2. I think it would be easy if you start with a limit on key personnel, say 100 and then sensible cash limit, 75 – 100 €million. Beyond conceptual design the manufacture of many parts and services (aero, CFD, carbon, logistics etc.) would need to be subcontracted and therefore create a paper trail that one FIA forensic accountant plus a few assistants can follow and ask relevant questions and then share and compare information with their compatriots working in other teams. It would be relatively easy to spot the cheats, and allow specialist companies to develop skills to meet the demands.

        The whole “highest tech” nature of F1 is the thing that needs to be unravelled. It would not be difficult if there was a consensus. The cost of entry into the sport needs to be massively reduced. 20 small, but clever and profitable teams must be preferable to four heavyweight dinosaurs.

  9. Can you make heads or tails of what exactly happened to cause the Great Pit Stop Screw-up?

    While the MB leadership have been very good about promptly admitting it was their fault, they’ve only said vague things about exactly how they got it wrong. Can you fill in any details?

    Also, Toto kept saying a big part of it was the lack of GPS at Monaco. Huh? Do you know why they don’t have GPS there? (It’s not like they have a huge hat on the whole place…)

    1. I think that the answer lies in nerds, algorithms, and calculation errors. Sometimes having too many geniuses on the same team can result in silly mistakes.

      1. Seems like Lewis was part of the decision-making process… so has to accept the consequences too…

        1. I am not sure he was. He may have thought that, but the team said that they called him in. Lewis obeyed the order.

          1. Actually the team told him to stay out. Only after Lewis questioned the team’s decision the team gave in and called him in.

        2. The pitwall acts a bit like a mathematical function. It takes a set of inputs (race lap, fuel level tyre wear, safety car, race position etc) from a number of different sources (Lewis, telemetry, experience etc), and turns these inputs into an output (in this case, a decision on what to do).

          In this case, the Mercedes pit wall looked at all of its inputs, Lewis’ tyre comments being only one, and came to the conclusion that a pit stop was necessary. It told Lewis so, and therefore he came in.

          You could argue that he might have ignored them, but why would he? It’s their job to make these decisions, simply because they have all the inputs (Lewis doesn’t). This is a team sport after all.

          Therefore, Lewis was not part of the decision making process like you proclaim, and was just providing a single input into a wider machine.

        3. Lewis was busy driving an F1 car faster than anybody else down curvy narrow streets… it’s the team’s job to ensure these things work out properly…

          It’s just not reasonable to put this on Lewis…

        4. Toto Wolff : “We told him to stay out and Lewis said “not good” and that the tyres had lost temperature. We had one second to react, and combined with our timing data, we made the mistake of calling him in”.
          I don’t know how much clearer Lewis’s role in the process can be… they told him to stay out, he responded, they listened to his response and, combined with other data, decided to call him in. All this in a very short time-frame.

          1. I preferred the era of F1 when the onus of such calls were on the driver. It appears now the drivers of today are simply pilots awaiting instruction from ‘mission control’ as opposed to having to think for themselves as was the case in previous days of F1.

          2. From the team and Lewis’s comments, it seemed like a simple case of crossed wires:

            Lewis was under the impression that the others had pitted and was discussing it from that stand point, whereas the team believed he just felt he needed new tires full stop.

            It seemed to me that the team said “the others didn’t pit”, or Lewis ask “did they pit”, all thoughts of Lewis pitting would have ceased, and he’d have stayed out.

            As for the *calculation* that showed he could safely pit, well that’s an inexcusable screw-up.

          3. When circumstances are “not good” for Lewis Hamilton, they are less good for the rest.

            You should worry when Hamilton says that things are really bad. Like when McLaren asked him to stay out on bad tyres in China 2007.

  10. Joe- The demise of CART as a rival to F1 had far more to due with the series splitting in two, as you well know. Prior to that it was a wonderful, very strong championchip. Penske stopped because they simply got beat, and badly, for too long. That was their fault alone. Tony George came along and singlehandedly destroyed open wheel racing in the U.S.
    I still take your point about customer cars being bad for F1, but CART before the split was a very different, magnificent, animal.

      1. First off Joe , kudos to you . This is one of your best !

        Second ; Actually if I may be so bold as to correct your assumptions Mr Saward . CART’s slide ever downward began when they tried to go International in an attempt to challenge F1’s worldwide dominance rather than accepting their role as a wonderfully successful feeder series to F1 as well as a great place for former F1 pilots to ‘ retire ‘ to once they had had enough of the F1 Circus , Bernie’s minions etc . The cost to the teams for CART’s futile attempts to become International [ as in races not on NA soil ] rising dramatically and then , and only then bringing about the events you mentioned as regards the escalating chassis costs , single make dominance etc . Which is to say Joe . There is no simple explanation just as there are no simple solutions . F1 certainly benefitted back in its former ‘ customer ‘ car days and done right might benefit today as well . But NOT if the current status quo all around is maintained in F1 . A lot needs desperately to change for our’ sport ‘ ( and I use that term loosely in regards to the modern era F1 ) to survive into the future

        Lastly , Two comments slightly but not altogether off topic ;

        1) As FIFA falls – So falls the FIA/F1 as well as the IOC ( you can bank on that last one coming )

        2) Minus all the excessive hype and hyperbole of NBCSN’s commentary along with my limited SSL* skills added to the fact that Univision’s crew talks a whole lot less ; Watching F1 on Spanish speaking Univision makes viewing the current F1 season almost palatable here in the US . Not enjoyable mind you . But at least reasonable and tolerable . Which is to say its amazing just how bad the commentary coming from the NBCSN staff has become of late .

        * Mexico City Spanish is spoken too rapidly for my limited SSL skills

        1. In the past I believe a reader of this blog shared a link to a story about Al Unser Jr.’s experience of a tryout at Williams. Wherein I think that Unser said he believed that Formula 1 powers felt threatened enough by CART that their real agenda was to make him, and CART by extension, look bad. All very interesting, but I’m with the contingent blaming Tony George alone for destroying a great thing, although Kevin Kalkhoven’s stubbornness made sure the victim was well and truly drowned before finally being pulled out of the water.

      2. My understanding of the downfall of open-wheel racing in America in general is that it started when USAC split it into sprint dirt and paved speedway racing in the late 60s – which was a natural progression of the sport, but nevertheless it broke away from its grassroots tradition and NASCAR passed it in the meantime.

        What the CART organization had to face when they took over in the late 70s – in an attempt to mimic F1 with the street courses et al – is that they were starting running out of a great deal of American racers due to two reasons: 1. the American tradition until that point dictated to move up from the dirt tracks to the paved ovals and ultimately to Indy, but the lower-tier cars did not prove to be a stepping stone to IndyCar any more, so a great deal of drivers started moving to NASCAR instead, and 2. even from IndyCar some drivers migrated to NASCAR, because it was a faster growing business than IndyCar, who – while still with USAC in the 70s – were too much Indianapolis-centered.

        While IndyCar ended up being a cheap – but thrilling – afterthought of F1, the popularity of it started falling behind of NASCAR’s by the early 90s due to international F1 veterans and wannabes dominating the growing number of street courses.

        The final blow came with the IRL split, losing Indianapolis and it was a slow- several year-long stagnation after that and a quick downfall. In a way, Tony George just wanted to revert the series into its pre-CART status – foolishly, but the intention was quite clear and his

        So – to sum up – the downfall of CART is just the natural extension of the whole downfall of open-wheel racing in America: it lost it touch with its core values and business, tried to be something that it wasn’t, which made teams, drivers, manufacturers and fans go somewhere else to find their American-racing-fix and found it in NASCAR.

      3. Equipment had nothing to do with the decline of Indycar. It was about power and money. Using the downfall of Indcyar as an argument against customer cars is a non sequitur argument

  11. Not to nitpick, but CART became ChampCar which ceased to exist. It did not become IndyCar. IndyCar (née IRL) separated in 1996.

    The racing in CART and ChampCar was still very good and had varied winners up until the end.

    However, regarding F1 you are right on the money.

  12. love the description of the journey home, I was visualising as I was reading and then wondered what car you were driving? – something old and beautiful with plenty of character I hope?

  13. I saw you having a quick chat on Ted’s paddock walk on Sky F1 over the weekend. Mr. Kravitz was awfully dismissive of you, when questioning you briefly on the strategy changes and custom cars and you went to mention the financial structure concerns and how to resolve them. I assume it isn’t really a popular subject in the paddock for most people?

  14. Joe,
    Thank you for your well-reasoned analysis.
    I would, however, like to respectfully disagree with respect to CART/Indycar.
    CART/Indycar did not became a one-chassis series because of a regulatory decision. Rather, it occurred through the natural competition you described in your post. If a regulatory body had enforced, a la Formula 1, a constructors-only, race-what-ya-built series, then CART/Indycar/whatever would not merely be the shadow of its former self, as you correctly point out, it would have ceased to exist entirely. Because there wouldn’t have been the sponsor or ticket dollars necessary for the parallel development of chassis, powerplants, aerodynamics, etc. At heart, it’s always been a small, national series (the Indy 500’s prominence notwithstanding).
    I agree that Formula 1 is special and its multi-make aspect is one of several things that make it so. And I agree with many of your suggestions for eliminating the dysfunction surrounding the operation of F1. However, I’m not sure that CART/Indycar’s trajectory is necessarily the object lesson that you think it is.

    1. If the teams had had to build their own cars then it would not have happened. This is the point.

      1. Joe, due respect but you are missing his point. Indy Car would have died years ago if “CART” had mandated that each team build its own chassis. The decline in the number of rolling chassis manufacturers was a natural attrition due to the rising costs (driven by technology) combined with a limited revenue pool. This made multiple chassis providers intractable, and they slowly dropped away to the point where “IRL/Indy Car” morphed the rules into a spec chassis.
        The dynamics are similar in F1. The rising costs of rolling chassis development, due to technology, combined with a limited revenue pool, is precisely what is hurting the mid field F1 teams.
        The difference, as you hypothesize, is that there is a pool of F1 revenue (unlike Indy) to which the teams do not presently have access, namely that which goes to the capital structure. The trouble with this hypothesis is that this ship has already sailed and won’t be returning to port. The equity has been sold to investors at high valuations, the balance sheet has been leveraged, the debt syndicated to investors, and the special dividends have been paid. You can’t unscramble this egg, at least not short of bankruptcy.

  15. Can’t fault most of what you say Joe. The only bit where we would part is that I don’t see the need for a technology driven F1. If the series was much much cheaper to enter, to build cars and engines for, there would be chances for new entrants and quite probably a better F1 would arise. As it stands, if the costs rise continuously, it will shrink. For me personally, as far as tech goes, less is more and I would enjoy the racing, which is something that it is difficult to do now.

    1. Technology has driven the sport since the start. It is the only thing that makes it different to other championships. Everyone is a constructor and everyone is looking for new technology.

      1. It hasn’t been as high tech as is the case today Joe, and there’s no denying that the costs of running in F1 are now just absurd, when judged against the performance of the cars and the competitiveness of the races.
        I think Gerard Lopez made the point a year or so back, that a good GP2 team can race on a sniff of money and provide great racing as well as being only 5-6 secs a lap slower than F1.
        On that basis the extraordinary high tech of F1 isn’t logical, when balanced against the need of good action for the spectators, and financial access for teams.
        Looking back, the era of high tech in F1 only really began with the introduction of carbonfibre chassis by McLaren in 1982 or around then, which was a great idea for safety, but brought about other uses for this expensive material, and that in turn has hugely increased costs. The other thing that helped push costs up, was the turbo period of 1977-1988, this brought on massive increases in engine costs, although it has to be said, that the cars were enormously impressive to watch in action, especially in qualifying!
        If you go back to the 60’s/70’s and early 80’s, costs were also lower ( and high tech less of an issue ), as chassis changes were kept to a minimum, with some race cars being used for several seasons, and remaining competitive with few alterations. The Lotus 72 is a classic example, which was in use from 1970 to 1975/76. The McLaren M23 had a long career from 1973 to 1977/78, the Brabham BT42 series was used effectively from 1973 to 1976/77, and there were others. This continuation of using chassis and then passing them on to small teams, was an effective way of running the series and keeping good racing. Throwing away chassis every year, and engines, is neither cost effective, not actually Green either. So, pushing high tech does not seem to really be required to make F1 attractive for an audience.

  16. “No matter what Lewis does someone thinks it is wrong” Sadly, this is true, but I find it is equally true of other top line drivers like Alonso and Vettel. In seems in the new online age, respect and civility is in shorter supply…

  17. I rather fear that everything you say is right but nothing will be done about it. Bernie did a good job over years promoting F1 above all other forms of motor sport, mainly for personal gain of course, but it’s passed its peak. The TV audience figures are at best stable but mainly on downward trend. Best not to talk about spectator attendance. A visual check of the grandstands at Monaco during qualifying tells the story, although race day looked full. Where I disagree with you on one issue is the matter of team involvement – surely, no teams no sport, whatever the disorganised bunch they may seem? If they don’t grab hold of the problems themselves and force the FIA, CVC et al to make changes there will not be any F1 left to argue about, as we know it anyway.

    1. I would not expect anything else. However if someone says these things then others can take up the cry and things do get changed…

  18. Clearly there are currently a number of problems that need to be SENSIBLY solved.

    However, it seems to me that as far as both enthusiasts and ‘Joe Public’ are concerned a big problem is the lack of overtaking opportunities.

    I’m not an expert but this appears to me to be primarily because of aerodynamics. In addition the amount spent on aerodynamic research and continuous upgrades must be very costly.

    I can see the benefits of engine, fuel efficiency and gearbox development, albeit also costly, being of benefit to the manufacture of ‘normal’ road cars but cannot really believe that aerodynamics will ‘flow through’ and make a real difference to majority of car owners.

    Therefore would a ‘sea change’ answer be to ban the use of air tunnels and to impose severe restrictions on wings, bodies and the underfloor etc. DRS would then no longer be necessary and damage to an aerodynamic part e.g. wing endplate would no longer effectively result in the end of the ability to race competitively.

    As well as reducing costs these changes will make driving the cars more difficult which would surely appeal to spectators ( both those attending races and those watching on TV ) and help to show who are the most able drivers.

    In the ‘good old days’ when the far from rich spectator did not feel marginalised drivers had to change gear, did not have radio communications etc to assist them and also did not confine themselves to racing Formula 1 cars.

    Thinking ‘outside the box’ perhaps the FIA could consider making the issue of the necessary license mandatory on also competing in a number of other races e.g. in say a one make series held not just concurrently with each Grand Prix event but also at a few none GP race meetings.

    Food for thought?

  19. One minor thing I’ll add about the current IndyCar structure is that although the Big Three of Penske, Ganassi and Andretti win the championships, the smaller teams such as Coyne,Schmidt, Fisher, Carpenter (the latter two are merged now) do win the occasional race. But few people are watching, although IndyCar claims they are now finally profitable.
    One big problem CART had was there was never a strong central leader to run the series, just a group of teams acting in their own self interest.
    F1 has a problem in distributing money. Indy Car has a problem in a lack of money to distribute. While one shouldn’t underestimate the pervasive grip of greed, the former is a better problem to have.

  20. With all due respect Joe, your analysis of CART/INDYCAR leaves out some very pertinent facts.
    Another reason for the decline of the series was as the 80’s progressed, the big name drivers Americans rooted for ie Foyt, Andretti, Mears, Rahal all retired. They were replaced by a series of pay drivers from South America, Europe and Asia.
    Fans in the US had no affinity to these drivers.
    Ticket sales and TV ratings reflected this.

    The CART INDYCAR split only made things worse for owners.

    No $ from TV and sponsors equals no $ for development; thus we ended up w a spec series.

    1. I don’t doubt all of that, but that is really not the point. The number of manufacturers dived as I explained.

      1. But, Joe, you’re putting all the weight on that one factor when in reality there were several important factors.

        I understand your concern for the future (at least you have plenty, unlike CVC), but IMO you’re skating a bit close to the edge of revisionist history by making it sound like this one factor was the primary determinant. People can debate the relative weight of the factors, but it certainly wasn’t the open-and-shut case you’re making it sound like.

        It’s like when a car crashes on the road at 60 mph hour in the rain while wearing old, bald tires. Was it the speed, or was it the wet road, or was it the bald tires? Well, it was the combination, wasn’t it? Same basic thing here.

        Personally, I think Tony George carried more destructive weight than any other factor. Had he not blown up the sport when he did, I expect other chassis designers and manufacturers would have come and gone. I don’t know of any compelling reason to think otherwise.

  21. Great article Joe, thanks!

    In many ways, the fate of Reynard is an even starker warning against customer cars than you made out. In 2001 they won the CART series with Gil de Ferran and Penske, and so started to design and build their 2002 machines on the assumption that they would have customers. Unfortunately for them, somehow ‘word’ got around that the 2002 Lola was something special and all their customers jumped ship to the competition. Reynard was left with about a dozen chassis in various stages of completion, having spent a lot of money on development, and with nobody to buy them. Cue instant bankruptcy and the 2002 series being the first one-make CART.

    Six four-car F1 teams will rapidly become four six-car teams, then two twelve-car teams, then one make only.

  22. “A good team will beat a bad team no matter what vehicles they race and how much money they have. Thus financial control is absolutely logical. There is no need to waste money.”

    There’s the solution. It is so logical. Here in the states, all the major sports leagues (NFL, NBA, MLB) all have team salary caps, and its done wonders for parity.

    F1 needs to get on board with cost controls and it needs to be policed so there’s no cheats. I believe, not only will it create better competition, but more innovation, as well.

  23. The demise of CART was indeed a complex mish-mash of issues, but one thing that stands out in the modern Indycar era is that a spec series with only one chassis supplier is not a great solution either if the series cannot control the cost of the chassis and spares. There was a long-running row inside IndyCar several years ago over the price of spare parts that was one of the reasons behind the departure of Randy Bernard. Many team owners felt they were being bilked by Dallara. IndyCar is now trying to “un-spec” itself via the aero kits route, but the single car supplier issue remains.
    Ulitimately we need a healthy F1 with teams building their own chassis, or a significant number of chassis manufacturers. I agree with Joe that a move to customer cars is the beginning of a dangerous trend.

  24. I agree with what you’re saying, Joe, but F1 at the moment reminds me of the BTCC just before it imploded.

    The same issues are in F1 as was in the BTCC: ridiculous technology costs that can’t be recouped, even by the winners, and the fact that most teams are not getting any bang for their buck.

    I’d hate to see customer teams, but I think the BTCC’s solution- run-what-you-brung cars built with off-the-shelf parts- is something that could help F1.

  25. “So I would argue that having customer chassis does not protect weak teams but rather condemns them to lose all independence.”

    Sauber to Sergio Perez: “We need this position.”

    Most of them have already lost their independence to their engine supplier.

  26. How about rules that say a chassis constructor can have a maximum of four cars, and only two of those cars can run the same brand of engine?

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